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Quantum Consciousness
Richard Mould∗
State University of New York, Stony Brook, N.Y.
Abstract
In a previous paper, the author proposed a quantum mechanical in-
teraction that would insure that the evolution of subjective states would
parallel the evolution of biological states, as required by von Neumanns
theory of measurement. The particular model for this interaction sug-
gested an experiment that the author has now performed with negative
results. A modified model is outlined in this paper that preserves the
desirable features of the original model, and is consistent with the experi-
mental results. This model will be more difficult to verify. However, some
strategies are suggested.
PACS 03.65 Quantum mechanics
PACS 03.65.Bz Foundations, theory of measurement
1 Introduction
For conscious states and brain states to mirror one another in any species,
thereby establishing what von Neumann calls a psycho-physical parallelism,
these intrinsically different states must evolve together and interact with one
other during their time of evolution. Standard physics makes no provision
for an interaction of this kind, but a quantum mechanical opening for an ob-
jective/subjective interaction is shown to exist, and is described in previous
papers.[1] [2]
Our theory of subjective evolution calls for the existence of a Central Mech-
anism (CM) within an evolving organism, which contains presently unknown
components of the nervous system. The function of a CM is to reduce quantum
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mechanical superpositions within the nervous system, and to simultaneously
give rise to a conscious experience of the eigenvalues of the reduction. This
accords with von Neumanns requirement that a quantum mechanical state re-
duction is accompanied by an observer’s conscious experience of the measured
variables. At the present time, no one knows what there is about a conscious
organism that gives rise to either consciousness or state reduction. We simply
combined these two mysteries inside the CM , thereby placing our ignorance in a
black-box so we can ask another question, namely: how do physical and mental
states evolve interactively to insure the psycho-physical parallelism?
The model in references 2 and 3 requires that a conscious organism sponta-
neously creates a profusion of macroscopic quantum mechanical superpositions
consisting of different neurological configurations. A mechanism for this gen-
eration is proposed by H. Stapp.[3] The result is a superposition of different
neurological states, each of which may be accompanied by a different subjective
experience. A reduction to a single eigenstate is not assumed to be triggered
microscopically along the lines of Ghirardi-Rimini-Weber[4]; but rather, it is
assumed to occur in response to a macroscopic event. It occurs the moment an
emerging subjective state becomes actively conscious in one of the macroscopic
neurological components of a Stapp superposition. The consciousness that is
associated with such a reduction is assumed to fade the moment reduction is
complete, and the resulting subjective pulse is supposedly followed by similar
pulses in rapid succession. This can make the subject aware of an apparent
continuum of consciousness.
Presumably, any reduction of this kind is accompanied by a reduction of
all other parts of the organism as well as all those parts of the external world
that are correlated with it. This means that a second observer, coming on
the heels of the first, will make an observation in agreement with the first.
More formally, a measurement interaction establishes correlations between the
eigenstates |ai〉 of some apparatus (with discrete variables ai), eigenstates of a
first observer|Φi〉, and eigenstates of a second observer |Θi〉, such that the total
state prior to reduction is given by |Ψ〉 = ΣiCi|ai〉|Φi〉|Θi〉. The coefficient Ci
is the probability amplitude that the apparatus is in state |ai〉. Let the first
observer become consciously aware of the apparatus variable ak. The resulting
reduction is a projection in Hilbert space that is found by applying the projection
operator of that observer |Φk〉〈Φk| to the total state.
|Φk〉〈Φk||Ψ〉 = Ck|ak〉|Φk〉|Θk〉 (1st reduction)
Let the second observer then become consciously aware of the apparatus variable
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am. The subsequent reduction is found by applying the projection operator of
that observer |Φm〉〈Φm| to the first reduction.
|Θm〉〈Θm|Ck|ak〉|Φk〉|Θk〉=δkmCk|ak〉|Φk〉|Θm〉 (2nd reduction)
Only if m = k is the probability non-zero that the second observer will make
a measurement. The second observer therefore confirms the results of the first
observer that the apparatus has been left in the eigenstate |ak〉.
Again, many of the particulars of a reduction (such as its nonlinearly) are
ignored in this paper so we can concentrate on the influence of subjective states
on physiological states. To this end we require that when the emerging subjec-
tive states of a neurological superposition are different from one another, they
will generally exert an influence on their relative probability amplitudes that is
a function of that difference. In particular, we imagine that when a painful
subjective state emerges in superposition with a pleasurable subjective state,
the probability amplitude of the painful state will be decreased relative to the
probability amplitude of the pleasurable state.
No currently known observation contradicts this conjecture, for no previously
reported experiment deals specifically with the creation of different observers
experiencing different degrees of pain, arising on different components of a
quantum mechanical superposition.
Let N in fig. 1 represent the nervous system of the first primitive organism
that makes a successful use of the subjective experience of pain. In a previous
paper we imagine this creature to be a fish. It is supposed that the fish makes
contact with an electric probe, at which time its nervous system splits into a
superposition (via the Stapp mechanism) consisting of a withdrawal behavior
W that is accompanied by [no pain], and a continued contact behavior C that
is accompanied by [pain]. The probability of survival of each component in this
highly artificial model is initially assumed to be 0.5. However, because of the
hypothetical influence of subjective pain on probability amplitudes, only the
withdrawal state is assumed to survive the reduction in this idealized example.
State reduction in fig. 1 is represented by the horizontal arrow. If W is further-
more a good survival strategy from the point of view of evolution, then the
associationW [no pain] and C[pain] will serve the species well, whereas a wrong
association W [pain] and C[no pain] will lead to its demise.
It does not matter to the above argument if the variables are pleasure/pain
or some other range of subjective experiences. If a subjective experience like ‘A’
increases the probability amplitude of an escape behavior, and if a subjective
experience like ‘B’ diminishes the probability amplitude of that behavior, and if
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the escape is one that moves the creature away from something that is dangerous
to its health, then a distant descendent will experience ‘A’ associated with life
supporting escapes, and ‘B’ associated with life threatening failures-to-escape.
It is apparent that the quality of the experience does not matter. We require
only that the subjective experience in question has a predictable plus or minus
effect on the probability amplitudes within a superposition, and the survival
mechanisms of evolution will do the rest. They will insure that the eventual
subjective life of a surviving species mirrors its experiences in a definite and
predictable way thereby establishing a reliable psycho-physical parallelism.
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Figure 2
We assume that ordinary perception do not have this effect. They do not
give rise to the hypothetical feedback. In fig. 2 we imagine the existence of an
externally imposed two component superposition consisting of environments e1
and e2, which is produced by using, say, a β source. The two environments
are assumed to have equal probability, and are allowed to interact with the
subjects nervous system given by N0. Before a reduction can occur, two con-
scious states emerge from the interaction represented by the superposition of
(eN)1[x1] and (eN)2[x2], where the conscious part shown in brackets is the ob-
served eigenvalue x associated with components 1 and 2. Since we require that
an observer of the perceived variable x cannot affect the probability of x, the
pure state reduces to a mixture having the same probability as the initial super-
position (horizontal arrows in fig. 2). State ei represents the relevant laboratory
apparatus together with the wider environment with which it is entangled. The
phase angles φ and φ′ are definite, but they are not localized to manageable
parts of the apparatus.[5]. We call them ”arbitrary” in this paper to indicate
that their values are not practically calculable, and to emphasize the lack of
coherence between these ”macroscopic” components.
On the other hand, if pain were the variable in fig. 2 rather than the
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externally perceived variable x, it is suggested by our hypothesis that the result-
ing mixture might no longer be a 50 - 50 split. This possibility is represented
in fig. 3, where the final mixture probabilities are left unspecified because they
must be discovered by observation. The author has now performed an experi-
ment of this kind with the result reported below.
2 The Experiment
Two scalers L and R recording local background radiation are placed side-by-side
in fig. 4. Their outputs are fed to a selector box that chooses channels L or R,
depending on which is the first to record a single count after the selector has
been turned on. A 20 V signal is then emitted from the output of the chosen
channel. The output on the R-channel is unused, but the L-output closes a relay
that puts 80 volts across two metal bars. Two seconds after the selection, an L
or R-light goes on indicating which channel was selected. A finger placed across
the metal bars will receive a painful 80V shock when the L-channel is selected.
This apparatus allows us to carry out the experiments diagramed in figs. 2
and 3. If the selector is initiated in the absence of an observer, we say that the
system will become a macroscopic superposition given by (eiφe1+ e2), where e1
is the entire apparatus following an L-channel activation, and e2 is the entire
apparatus following an R-channel activation. The incoherence of the two com-
ponents (represented by the arbitrary angle φ) is generally understood to mean
that the system is indistinguishable from a classical mixture, since interference
between these macroscopic components is not possible. However, for reasons
given in previous papers, we claim that the final state is really an incoherent
quantum mechanical superposition rather than a classical mixture.1 The lack
1The uncertainty associated with a classical mixture state represents an outsider’s igno-
rance, whereas a pure quantum mechanical state superposition represents an uncertainty that
is intrinsic to the system (see ref. 1, pp. 1622, 1624; and ref. 2, bottom of p. 1703). Following
von Neumann, we assume that the initial intrinsic uncertainty (concerning which of the scalers
fires first) will remain an intrinsic uncertainty until it is reduced by “observation”. Hence, the
apparatus will remain a macroscopic pure state quantum mechanical superposition until an
observation occurs.
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of interference between the components has no bearing on our result because
the hypothetical effect described in this paper relates to, and directly affects,
probability amplitudes only. The effect we are looking for should be observable
with or without coherence between L and R.
If an observer is present and exposed only to the L-light or the R-light,
then a reduction will occur like the one in fig. 2, where eigenvalues x1 and
x2 represent a conscious experience of one or the other of those lights. If the
observer is exposed only to a conscious experience of “pain or no pain” through
his finger across the metal bars, then a reduction like the one in fig. 3 will occur.
This experiment may not appear to be quantum mechanical, but it is quantum
mechanical by virtue of the particular hypothesis that is being tested in fig. 3.
The equipment in fig. 4 was used for a total of 2500 trials, each consisting
of two parts. The authors finger was first placed across the metal bars, the
selector was turned on, and a shock or no shock was recorded before the lights
were observed. In the second part of each trial the finger was replaced by an
equivalent resistance, the selector was again initiated, and the appearance of
the L or R channel light was recorded.
Total number of trials . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . N = 2500
Number of shocks received in the first part . . . . . . . . . . . . . NS = 1244
Number of times the L-light went on in the second part . . . . . NL = 1261
There are three possible outcomes of a single trial. Either the differenceNL - NS
increases, or it decreases, or it remains the same. The three possibilities are
represented by the variables u (increase) occurring with a probability p, and
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d(decrease) with a probability q, and e (remain the same) with a probability r.
It was found in the experiment that u = 632 and d = 615 after 2500 trials.
If we approximate p0 = NL/N to be the probability that the left channel
fires in the second part of each trial (absent the finger), and q0 = 1 − p0 to be
the probability that the right channel fires in the second part of each trial, then
p0 = 1261/2500 = 0.5044 q0 = 0.4956
Assuming as a null hypothesis that there is no statistical difference between the
displacement of a finger across the metal bars and an equivalent resistor, we
have p = p0q0, q = q0p0, and r = p
2
0
+ q2
0
, giving
p = 0.2500 q = 0.2500 r = 0.5000
The variances of (u+ d) and (u− d) are
σ2(u+ d) = < (u + d)2 > − < u+ d >2= σ2(u) + σ2(d) +X
σ2(u− d) = < (u − d)2 > − < u− d >2= σ2(u) + σ2(d)−X
therefore
σ2(u− d) = 2σ2(u) + 2σ2(d)− σ2(u + d)
= 2p(q + r)N + 2q(p+ r)N − r(p+ q)N
or
σ(u − d) = [[4pq + r(p+ q)]N ]1/2 = [N/2]1/2 = 35.4
Our alternative hypothesis is that u−d is significantly different from 0. But
from the data, u − d = NL −NS = 17 after 2500 trials, and this is well within
the above the standard deviation around 0. The separate variables u and d are
also within the standard deviation σ(u) = σ(d) = [p(q+ r)N ]1/2 = 21.7 of their
expected value of 625.
One can always argue that the statistics are inadequate to reveal a signifi-
cant difference between u and d. However, they are sufficient to convince the
author that the presence of pain on one component of this externally imposed
superposition has no significant effect on the outcome. We therefore conclude
that the reduction in fig. 3 is not affected by the subjective content of the square
brackets in that figure.
Further details about this experiment can be found in the document ”QC
Experiment” on the authors home page.[6]
7
3 Model Modification
This result forces us to make a distinction between externally imposed super-
positions and the superpositions created internally by a CM .
In fig. 5 we let a CM interact with an environmental superposition, where
the latter includes all that is not contained in the CM (including other possible
CMs within the organism). The first pair of diverging arrows in that figure
carries the initial product into components (eCM)1 and (eCM)2. This reaction
goes according to Schro¨dinger. The subsequent pairs of diverging arrows shown
in fig. 5 denote the appearance of new superpositions that are produced by the
(Schro¨dinger) process proposed by Stapp. It is at this point that we engage the
(non-Schro¨dinger) hypothesis of sect. 1 that allows the emerging ‘subjective’
states on different components of these CM -superpositions to vary their own
probability amplitudes. However, we add the further stipulation that any such
variation can only occur relative to the other components of the originating
CM -superposition. This restricts the range of states over which the relative
amplitude variation can take place.
}
e1
e2 (0.5)
(0.5)
{ CM
(0.5)
(0.5) CM 2
CM 1e
e
(
(
)
)
Figure 5
It is thereby required that any variation (due to the hypothetical subjective
influence) that takes place within (eCM)1 in fig 5 has no effect on a variation
within (eCM)2, and vice versa. More generally, the probability amplitude of
any CM as a whole is not affected by a variation that takes place outside of
itself, so the normalization of each component (eCM)i of the superposition is
preserved.
This modification is consistent with the results of the experiment in sect. 2.
The superposition in our experiment is represented by the first pair of diverging
arrows. Since it is external and not created by the CM, it cannot, according
to the above stipulation, be affected by the subjective content of components
1 and 2. On the other hand, the second pairs of diverging arrows represent
superpositions that are created by the CM s 1 and 2, so they are subject to our
hypothesis of sect. 1. On this modified model, subjective evolution does not
rely in any way on externally created superpositions, thereby insuring that the
observer of (external) quantum mechanical systems will always record eigenval-
ues with the probability predicted by standard theory.[7] At the same time, our
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hypothetical subjective influence can still be realized within either one of the
CM -superpositions in the figure.
With this modification, the hypothesis becomes much more difficult to demon-
strate experimentally. Although verification remains possible in principle, it will
require a more detailed understanding of the workings of the nervous system
and/or other parts of the body.
4 Bio-Active Peptides
Neurological communication depends on the diffusion of chemical neurotrans-
mitters across the synaptic junction between neurons. There is another commu-
nication system within the body that makes use of chemicals that are produced
at one site and received at another; but in this case, the distances between
a production and receiver sites are macroscopic. About 95% of these chem-
ical communicators are peptides, which are mini-proteins consisting of up to
100 amino acids having a maximum atomic mass of 10,000 u. Their classical
dimensions are ∆x =10 nm at most, which we assume approximates their size
close to the production site.[8] Therefore, Heisenberg tells us that the minimum
quantum mechanical uncertainty in the velocity of one of these free peptides is
∆v =0.63 mm/s. Peptides are carried through intercellular space by blood and
cerebrospinal fluid. They do not move very far in a tenth of a second, but in
that time the Heisenberg uncertainty in position of a peptide will be at least
∆s = ∆v∆t = 63 mm. This is an enormous uncertainty of position relative to
one of the peptide receptor sites which has a size similar to that of the peptide,
and which is often separated from its neighbors by comparable distances. There-
fore, quantum mechanical uncertainty is an important factor in determining the
probability that a given peptide is captured by a given receptor.
Stapps mechanism for introducing quantum mechanical superpositions into
the brain relies on the uncertainty in the position of calcium ions in neuron
synapses. We suggest that peptides represent another possible source of super-
positions that may be just as widespread. And because peptides play an impor-
tant role in the chemistry of the body, they too may have a significant quantum
mechanical influence on behavior.
As with the Stapp mechanism, one might object that the uncertainty associ-
ated with the peptides classical diffusion during its migration will overwhelm the
quantum mechanical uncertainty, or that a large number of migrating molecules
will obscure all quantum mechanical effects. However, the classical uncertainty
associated with many-particle ensembles has only to do with our ignorance
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of initial conditions. In reality, the only uncertainties a receptor will see are
those associated with an incoherent quantum mechanical superposition of pure
peptide states. This superposition will have as many components as there are
peptide molecules involved. And since our hypothetical influence acts through
the amplitude of these components, the presence of a large number of indepen-
dent particles will only increase the hypothetical influence.
5 Drugs
There are many drugs that can be introduced into the body that will compete
with endogenous peptides to occupy the bodys receptor sites, and some of these
drug molecules are small enough to have a very large quantum mechanical
uncertainty of position. For this reason, peptide/drug superpositions are more
promising for the purpose of experimental manipulation than calcium ion super-
positions.
For example, endorphins are peptides that unite with special receptors to
eliminate pain and/or produce euphoria. They and their receptors can be found
everywhere in the body, but they are most intensely located in the limbic system
of the brain. There is a drug called naloxone that is a strong competitor
with the endorphins to occupy the same receptors, and it has the property
that it reverses the analgesic/pleasurable effects of the endorphins.[8][9][10] If
endorphin molecules and externally administered naloxone molecules are in
quantum mechanical superposition with one another as their sizes and likely
time together suggests, and if they both compete with one another for successful
attachment to the same receptor site, then the ratio of endorphin attachments
to naloxone attachments would (according to our hypothesis) be a function
of the competing subjective states. Since the difference in subjective effects
between these two molecules is considerable along the pleasure/pain spectrum,
an experimental design involving endorphin/naloxone superpositions appears to
offer an opportunity to test the modified model proposed in sect. 3. The author
is not able to propose a specific experiment at this time, but an approach along
these lines seems promising.
6 Evolutionary Advantage
It was pointed out in a previous paper that our evolutionary mechanism of
objective-subjective interaction (represented by fig. 1) does not insure that a
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creature evolving under its influence will evolve more quickly or be more suc-
cessful than a creature evolving strictly as an automaton. That will be true
as well of the modified model in sects. 3-5. However, it is not unreasonable
to suppose that both conscious evolution and autonomic evolution might work
separately and in tandem with one another. The kinds of neurological changes
that are necessary for autonomic evolution might very well be independent of
the kinds of neurological changes that are necessary for quantum/consciousness
evolution. If that is so, and if these two processes work in tandem, then the
evolution of the organism will be faster than either the autonomic route by it-
self, or the conscious route by itself. One would then be able to say that the
introduction of consciousness as proposed in this paper will always work to the
advantage of the organism.
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